Debt financing is an important financing method. Debt is positive to corporate governance in standard finance theories, for it can constrain the agency cost of manager. 负债融资是一种重要的公司融资方式，西方理论认为负债具有积极的公司治理作用，因为负债可以缓解管理者的代理成本。
The Theory and Positive Analysis of the Agency Problem between Owner and Manager in Modern Company 公司制企业所有者与经营者的代理问题理论与实证分析
With the development of modern enterprise, the core issue of corporate governance has gradually shifted from the agency problem between shareholders and manager to the interest conflict between major shareholders and minor shareholders. 随着现代企业制度实践的发展，公司治理的核心问题逐步从股东与经理之间的委托代理冲突转为大股东与中小股东之间的利益冲突。
The emergence of large shareholder reduces the cost agency between the shareholder and manager because of solving the free-riding caused by dispersed ownership structure. But it gives birth to another agency problem between large and minority shareholders. 大股东的出现可以解决股东分散带来的搭便车问题，减少股东与管理者之间的代理成本，但同时，大股东的出现又带来了另一个代理问题：大股东与小股东之间的代理问题。
Although there are worldwide achievements in the studies on agency behavior of company manager, it is unfeasible to apply directly some of them to the practices of corporate governance in China. 尽管一些学者对公司经营者代理行为进行了研究并取得了一些成果，但由于种种原因，直接应用其中某些结果可能并不适宜我国公司治理现状。
